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ARTICLE
Denunciation and doxing: towards a conceptual model of
digital vigilantism
Daniel Trottier
Department of Media and Communication, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Rotterdam, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Individuals rely on digital media to denounce and shame other
individuals. This may serve to seek justice in response to perceived
oﬀences, while often reproducing categorical forms of discrimina-
tion. Both oﬀence taking and its response are expressed online by
gathering and distributing information about targeted individuals.
By seeking their own form of social and/or criminal justice, parti-
cipants may supersede institutions and formal procedures. Yet
digital vigilantism includes shaming and other forms of cultural
violence that are not as clearly regulated. They may feed from
state or press-led initiatives to shame targets, or simply to gather
information about them. Digital vigilantism remains a contested
practice: Terms of appropriate use are unclear, and public dis-
course may vary based on the severity of the oﬀence, the severity
of response, and on participants’ identities and aﬃliations. This
paper advances a conceptually informed model of digital vigilant-
ism, in recognition of its coordinated, moral and communicative
components. Drawing upon literature on embodied vigilantism as
well as concurrent forms of online coordination and harassment, it
considers recent cases in a global context in order to direct sub-
sequent analysis of how digital vigilantism is rendered meaningful.
KEYWORDS
Vigilantism; digital media;
shaming; online justice
Current social and political discourse is heavily shaped through media practices in both
obvious and not so obvious ways. In particular there are speciﬁc aﬀordances and cultural
expectations that shape contemporary digital media use, which direct our way of
relating and coordinating among citizens. Because of the ease with which users can
search, solicit and disseminate personal information, these can be used to mobilise
outrage for various cultural and political ends. In some cases these operate as cohesive
organisations, as when the Russian group Lev Protiv shame and call attention to
individuals who seem publicly intoxicated. In other cases, high-proﬁle criminal events
mobilise civil society to identify suspects, as was the case following the Boston Marathon
bombing in 2013. Still others are one-oﬀ incidents that nevertheless are contextualised,
embedded in and rendered meaningful through contemporary media practices. As an
example, in 2013 a conference attendee publicly denounced via Twitter two other
attendees for their sexualised comments, and uploaded a photo of the perpetrators.
One of the targets lost his job. Yet the denouncer, an African-American woman, also lost
her job in consequence, and became the target of racist and sexist vitriol. Journalists and
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other public ﬁgures picked up on the incident, furthering the visibility of all three
primary participants, in order to advance public discourse about gendered harassment
as well as ‘call-out culture’ as a viable form of social action.1
These examples provide a brief account of the range of social actors engaging in
digitally mediated forms of vigilantism. This refers to a set of practices to scrutinise,
denounce and even leverage harm against those deemed to transgress legal and/or
moral boundaries, with the intention of achieving some form of justice.2 These practices
can be understood as facilitated by media aﬀordances that enable users to share and
distribute content with each other, coupled with socio-cultural expectations that serve
to reproduce and even renegotiate what is considered acceptable within a particular
social context.3 The notion of digital vigilantism includes responses to criminal events as
well as oﬀences that transgress moral or normative boundaries. While high-proﬁle cases
include responses to criminal acts, the same tools and practices can be used in contexts
where the justice sought is more social than legal or where are not aligned with
normative demands.4 In discussing embodied forms of vigilantism, Johnston notes the
complexity of distinguishing legal from moral pursuits, citing cases featuring
a conﬂuence of these frameworks.5 Likewise, Moncada notes that while it is possible
to consider moral vigilantism as a variant of embodied vigilantism, this risks overextend-
ing such a concept, notably when other terms such as hate crime are more apt.6 This is
indeed true, and an important task in this article is to consider the conceptual overlap of
neighbouring terms. Yet it remains important to consider that vigilantism serves to
uphold institutionalised norms, and the status of these norms and the degree to
which they are institutionalised remains contested.7 For instance in and beyond the
Anglo-American context citizens have directed public attention to longstanding forms of
sexual assault and harassment. This involves unambiguous violations of laws, but also
behaviour and attitudes that are insuﬃciently targeted in existing legal frameworks, yet
remain actionable.8
While it has always been possible denounce others, digital vigilantism implicates the
active and passive participation of other individuals as well as several types of organisa-
tions. Contemporary media cultures allow virtually anybody to engineer and exploit the
visibility of a targeted individual for an assortment of social, cultural, economic and
political ends. This is not only through the capture of original footage of a target, or the
repurposing of content already available online, but also through the fabrication of image
or video content made to appear veracious.9 Despite the range of motivations and desired
outcomes fuelling these practices, they are united through their denunciatory nature, in
which they link particular grievances to targeted individuals. These occur in cultural
contexts that seek and celebrate forms of social justice – or some form of shared values
and morality more generally – through the vigilance and participation of an assembly of
social actors. To be clear, these cultural practices can also serve to reproduce misogyny,
racism and other forms of categorical discrimination. Such practices risk being oversha-
dowed in public discourse by adjacent phenomena like hate speech and cyberbullying.
Yet digital vigilantism is a pervasive and mobilising force, linking up with these harms, but
also broader organisational logics that solicit and shape mediated activity.
Recent press coverage on weaponised media places emphasis on cyber security
incidents such as the SONY/North Korea hacking incident in 2014, Ashley Madison in
2015, and of American and French presidential candidates more recently.10 In doing so,
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they risk overlooking more routinized and accessible practices. While hacking and other
cyber threats can indeed harm the social standing of those who are exposed, they
involve skillsets and technologies often limited to an elite few. Yet even high-tech forms
of hacking enable further repurposing of this data through more vulgarised forms of
data searching and distribution. Social harm might not only emanate from those who
ﬁrst access and source compromising data from a secure location, but also from those
who apply the now-public data to particular contexts, or for particular audiences.
Digital vigilantism may be framed as the dark side of online engagement through
related practices such as vitriol or trolling. Yet a key concern in this area of study is that
digital vigilantism is not simply problematic or deviant. Rather, it may be understood as
a standardised mode of communication, and may elicit popular support under speciﬁc
conditions.11 It is a mode or organising for individuals as well as institutions, by gaining
and leveraging attention against targeted others. It is also a wilful strategy that is partly
informed by (but also exceeding) tabloid culture and reality TV.12 Likewise, social media
platforms are reluctant to fully prohibit practices that are entirely dependent on their
infrastructure. While mindful of social responsibility and the impact on their own
reputations, platforms like YouTube and Twitter beneﬁt from the frenzy of user activity
emerging from denunciatory campaigns, notably as even critical engagements will occur
through these platforms. As was the case with social media’s initial emergence in the
mid 2000s, digital vigilantism involves a set of reasonably accessible technologies as well
as rapidly popularised cultural practices that are spread to a range of social actors. Social
media was rendered culturally meaningful and negotiated in terms of perceived appro-
priateness in various cultural contexts.13 Indeed, concepts such as privacy, reputation
and even sharing evoke debates that are opened up anew under current conditions.
This paper will advance a comprehensive understanding of the use of visibility and
reputation of individuals as a means of communicating, organising, and governing by
digital media users. The next section considers recent scholarship related justice seeking
online. This is followed by a consideration of how such practices are manifest discur-
sively by principal social actors. This paper then oﬀers a tentative procedural model to
understand digital vigilantism, including a conceptualisation of core concepts and
adjacent terms, along with a consideration of key questions for subsequent research.
Mediated justice seeking and its scholarly challenges
Individuals can exploit the visibility and reputation of other individuals as a means of
communicating. Targeted individuals may either voluntarily post content about them-
selves or their peers – though not necessarily consenting to the appropriation of that
content – or may be involuntarily recorded engaged in untoward behaviour. This
content becomes a means to express outrage about particular events, but also serves
as convenient and tangible focal points for more abstract societal concerns. Moreover, it
becomes a means to draw attention to both press outlets and social media platforms.
Both collective outrage and the target’s reputation are leveraged for a variety of ends.
While scholarly approaches to online harassment contend that the invisibility of social
actors enables abusive behaviour, digital vigilantism is predicated on the ampliﬁed
visibility of the person receiving abuse.14 The relative ease of access to a substantial
audience is also a feature that is now available to those who initiate the shaming of
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others. Moreover, these audiences make take on an active role in these campaigns by re-
circulating damning content, adding their own commentary or even information about
targets. In some cases, the audience can be minimal, but the imagined or anticipated
social impact can still harm the targeted individual as well as the broader community to
which they belong.15 Yet in many cases, individuals are the subsequent targets of
actualised harassment, as well as consequences that may impact their life chances, for
example, if evidence of their oﬀence emerges during an online search when seeking
employment, or while held at a border crossing.16
Instances of digital vigilantism are typically characterised by spontaneous and unre-
ﬂexive activity as well as coordinated actions. Embodied vigilantism necessitates
a degree of planning, or is otherwise categorised a self-defence.17 Yet aﬀordances of
social platforms such as their connectivity (van Dijck and Poell 2013) mean that planned
coordination can follow spontaneous actions, and vice versa.18 In other words some
related practices may be spontaneous, such as immediately capturing and uploading
content as well as commenting on or sharing that content. Yet other aspects require
deliberate planning, such as managing a presence on a digital platform, or coordinating
a denunciatory response. For states, but also media outlets, social media platforms and
other organisations, such incidents may amount to a form of ‘soft’ governance, where
social norms are enforced and renegotiated and expressed through digital media and
through communities.19 Given the ease through which various social actors can re-
mediate content by re-posting it on any available social platform, it remains possible
that an incident that one social actor ﬁrst launches is then repurposed and appropriated
by another, for example, when tabloid newspapers provide extensive coverage of uncivil
behaviour ﬁrst documented by an individual. Approaching this in terms of a single
category of social actor is tempting, but overlooks a broader context, notably as they
take up similar devices and practices and may even sustain symbiotic relations. When
considering the recent history of using digital media to monitor and discipline one
another, we may speak of a mutual augmentation of shaming, as participants demand
audiences, trigger responses, and produce content that are circulated by others.20
Public discourses and social responses to denunciations and discrediting content vary
tremendously, in part because assessments of these practices often have to reconcile
events that vary radically in terms of ideology and intent. To some degree shaming and
moralising can be socially progressive by raising awareness of social issues such as
gendered forms of harassment, but are also used to reproduce privilege and asymmetrical
power relations. Most cases emerge in response to an oﬀensive act, and are often
expressed in criminal, ethical and moral terms. Even high-proﬁle instances of sexist and
racist abuse such as Gamergate attempt to frame their actions in terms of a moral high
ground by invoking a concern over ethics in video game journalism.21 Likewise, some
incidents occur in context of broader cultural shifts such as #metoo, while others fail to
evoke an impact to the same degree.22 What unites these incidents is the use of digital
media to render oﬀences, oﬀenders – and in some cases, the denunciator themselves –
visible to public scrutiny. These practices have some precedent, and to some degree this is
captured through the use of the term vigilantism. This term stresses citizen-led interven-
tions against other individuals, often overlapping with and even contesting institutional
forms of justice seeking, while often reproducing established cultural values.
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Digital vigilantism is made meaningful through a range of social actors who are either
directly participating in or oﬀering commentary on events. As such, the vocabulary
employed has a formative role in terms of asserting and contesting what is considered
acceptable. Many terms employed to describe practices are sourced from digital media
subcultures (‘ownage’; ‘rekt’; ‘btfo’) and betray a juvenile and clandestine nature. Terms
may highlight contemporary media aﬀordances (‘leaks’; ‘screencapping’) that underline
the ease with which information can be transmitted. Terms such as ‘receipts’ (denoting
a proof of oﬀence such as a screenshot of a since-deleted message) implicate an
economy and legitimation of outrage. Some terms used may be platform speciﬁc,
such as ‘subtweeting’ (posting a critical statement about someone without directly
identifying them). Yet as these practices can easily spread beyond any single platform,
the relevance of such terms may exceed the immediate context of (in the above
example) Twitter. Participants may also be framed through subject positions such as
social justice warriors, keyboard warriors or trolls, but also ‘reaguurders’ in the Dutch
context, and ‘diaosi’ in China, each of which carry connotations that appear both self-
deprecating and mobilising.23 Editorials and blog posts with titles like ‘We with the
Pitchforks’ (Mae 2016) suggest an embracing attitude towards mediated vigilantism (in
this case, following the denunciation of a convicted rapist). Other concepts such as the
‘vampire’s castle’ and ‘weaponised autism’ both refer to collective and contextualised
attempts to inﬂict harm upon others. We may presume that denunciations serve to
explicitly and implicitly communicate desirable social values. Such campaigns may also
be an opportunity for a social actor to demonstrate moral or cultural legitimacy by
asserting prescriptive and proscriptive cultural values and self-deputising itself as an
arbiter on such matters, for example, when anti-paedophile organisations assert an
ability to protect vulnerable youth. In doing so they may accumulate forms of cultural
and symbolic capital, yet economic, political and social capital also shape the reception
and legitimacy of such eﬀorts.24 Such capital may be deliberately solicited, for example,
through merchandise sales online, or may be an unintended consequence of mediated
exposure.
We may consider how engaging and responding to mediated vigilantism in turn
shape conditions of mediated visibility for individuals. Digital vigilantism amounts to
a coordinated attack on a targeted individual. The immediate consequences, intended or
otherwise, may include damaging the public standing of the individual under scrutiny,
as well as those who may share aﬃliations such as their family, political party, or
employer. Regarding the latter, recent cases in the Anglo-American context suggest
that job loss is a common tactic, and that employability is a common rhetorical feature
when expressing targeted outrage.25 While an individual target may be centred in such
incidents, we must consider how broader audiences are also implicated. The harm
invoked is only made possible through the shared understanding that a target is
rendered visible to a broader audience, whether that audience is actively watching, or
is manifest primarily as an imagined potential. Yet such denunciations play a disciplining
role to audience members who may identify with the target, for example, as members of
the same minority group. And while the target is the primary recipient of social harm,
those participating may also experience unanticipated and unwanted scrutiny, as seen
in one of the opening examples. For this reason many individuals and organisations
employ a strategic approach to visibility, for example by using ‘throwaway’ accounts not
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linked to any other identiﬁable information, as well as removing content from the
Internet after a limited period of time. While instances of digital vigilantism generate
attention as they unfold, scholars remain unaware of longer-term consequences for
those who participate or are otherwise implicated in these practices. Individuals who
have been exposed to denunciation cope with a compromised reputation, a process
shaped both by cultural and technical features. Search-engine manipulation stands as
a prominent means to sanitise one’s online presence, albeit one that remains unaﬀord-
able to many.26 Among more commonly proposed remedies to coordinated harass-
ment – especially of women – is for the target to close their social media accounts. This
amounts to a self-silencing, without addressing the source of harm, nor the possibility of
continued abuse.27 We can imagine that potential remedies will in turn be shaped by
public understandings of the risks and outcomes of public shaming. It is equally
important to consider the broader viability of mediated denunciation for organisations,
as well as the press, government branches and social media platforms, which all may in
fact be direct or implicit participants. Digital vigilantism is made up of mediated
practices that are currently accessible to virtually any social actor. On basis of the
controversy that recent incidents have generated in public discourse, one can anticipate
that this may not remain the case in certain jurisdictions over time, either through legal,
technical or cultural developments.
Denunciation and discursive relations
When considering denunciation as a mediated phenomenon, one must consider dis-
cursive power relations as they are manifest online and in the press, especially insofar as
social actors invoke discourses when seeking various forms of capital. When considering
who is permitted to speak about which individuals and which topics in the context of
denunciation, several categories of relationships warrant scrutiny. First, the target of
denunciation in relation to campaign initiators, who in turn invoke (a) other participants
who may share content, add commentary, and even add additional information about
target, (b) an often immeasurable audience of media users (social media, but also other
media such as the press), and (c) a more abstract understanding of society from which
the target – and the broader communities to which they belong – may be expelled. This
can remain in abstract as a kind of existential dread, or as speciﬁc imagined others such
as a future employer. On ﬁrst pass this appears to be a largely unidirectional relation,
with one party acting, others mediating (or mitigating), and another being acted upon,
and possibly reacting. In practice we may anticipate a more complex set of commu-
nicative relations. Here we may consider if speciﬁc categories of social actors are in
a more advantageous position to claim what is deemed oﬀensive or otherwise action-
able. Conversely, are there conditions where targets are able to refute the denunciation
levelled against them? If we accept the premise that such denunciations take place in
the closest contemporary equivalent to a public sphere, and that disadvantaged com-
munities have historically been and continue to be poorly served by such platforms, it
stands to reason that a reliance on platforms like Twitter to air social grievances may
exacerbate categorical forms of discrimination.28
Second, we can consider discursive relations between participants and the state.
Denunciation may be understood alongside other kinds of user-led forms of justice
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seeking that together express a crisis of legitimacy of the state. Mediated vigilante
ﬁgures like the Guardian Angels, Bernhard Getz and even ﬁctional characters like Paul
Kersey (from the Death Wish franchise) signify a failure of public order and governance,
and thus directly challenge the eﬀectiveness and legitimacy of the state, most notably in
terms of a supposed monopolisation of the legitimate force. Although physical violence
is a possible outcome in digital vigilantism, we need to reconsider cultural violence as it
now relates to harms that can be invoked through prominent representations of the
individual. These forms of violence are less explicitly regulated by governments,
although we may expect this to change through law, policy and public discourse.
Additionally, vigilante groups may challenge states, but are also often a manifestation
of hegemonic cultural values (and in some cases reinforce hegemonic economic rela-
tions). In response police and other state branches may either ignore, sanction or
support vigilante groups. Their oﬃcial position will likely diﬀer based on characteristics
of movements, which becomes diﬃcult if public discourse contributes to a sense of
equivalence among various cases of shaming.
Third we can consider how the press contributes to making shaming meaningful.
Digital media enable participants and supporters to oﬀer their own commentary that
journalists (among others) can either support or contest by integrating it into press
coverage of incidents. Beyond journalists, it is important to consider the discursive
inﬂuence of other public ﬁgures such as politicians, academics, public intellectuals,
and others who happen to command a sizeable (social media) audience, notably
when commenting on controversial or otherwise culturally signiﬁcant events. As was
the case when social media surveillance ﬁrst entered public consciousness, there is
a polyphony of social actors who can collaborate or compete to make mediated
denunciation meaningful.
Finally, we may consider social media platforms as passive venues for the above
exchanges, yet platform designers shape how digital vigilantism itself is expressed when
implementing and commenting on changes made these spaces. As discussed above it is
also necessary to consider barriers preventing social actors to access devices and plat-
forms, as well as the necessary forms of literacy and legitimacy.29 Addressing these so-
called digital divides may be regarded as a democratising force, or a levelling of the
playing ﬁeld. Yet this may be a naive view that overlooks reproduction of discrimination
not only in its eﬀects, but even in attempts to engage in online denunciations, such that
addressing systemic forms of discrimination may remain as diﬃcult as ever. This is
evident when considering feminist forms of justice seeking that aim to raise awareness
and denounce pervasive forms of gender-based harassment and discrimination online.30
Familiarity with technology is also important to consider when studying public dis-
course, as any account of digital vigilantism places demands on its audience. Media
venues vary in terms of expectations about knowledge of terminologies, platforms, and
prescribed behaviour for the audience-as-digital media user. For example, if addressing
a largely non-media-savvy audience, journalists may encounter less resistance when
asserting speciﬁc understandings of concepts, such as platform-speciﬁc parlance.
When studying mediated vigilante campaigns, it often seems that press and other
forms of reporting are much more prominent than the campaign itself. A denunciatory
post on a message board may generate a few thousand views, but this visibility may be
greatly ampliﬁed if a journalist covers the incident. We may even question the
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distinction between weaponised attempts to make someone visible and press coverage
of it, notably if participants are strategically seeking the attention of the press. Thus
journalists and others commenting on such incidents may have a bearing not only on
how it is rendered meaningful, but may also contribute to harm inﬂicted on the target,
and perhaps a broader community under scrutiny. In further questioning the distinction
between platforms that propagate these campaigns, and those that claim to merely
report on them, Reddit and the Dutch platform GeenStijl are examples of venues where
denunciations can occur, but also that can publish reports and editorials on such events.
Yet this same conﬂuence can be found in tabloid media, which may either engage in its
own denunciations or give coverage to existing campaigns.31
Towards a procedural model of digitally mediated vigilantism
We may consider how digital vigilantism as a set of practices is rendered meaningful in
public discourse. Moreover, who is permitted to speak about these practices? Who has
‘access to or control over public discourse’ on this topic.32 A ﬁrst step towards such an
analysis is to consider how to conceptualise digital vigilantism, in order to identify
concepts that inform and possibly direct media coverage of this content. The tentative
model (Figure 1) draws on scholarly literature and empirical instances of shaming in
order to consider digital vigilantism as a process consisting of distinct stages, themselves
consisting of speciﬁc practices.
Past studies of online harassment and surveillance account for the discursive and
collective dimensions of mediated shaming. This can be understood as a procedural
model structured in terms of policing, discovery and denunciation of oﬀensive content,
with each step composed of speciﬁc practices. Mediated policing produces conditions
Figure 1. A tentative model of digital vigilantism.
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that facilitate the discovery of oﬀences, which in turn trigger denunciatory practices.
These are shaped by conditions of visibility, and in turn may re-shape these conditions
through public debate, and even legislative and platform-based reforms. Each practice
can involve a range of social actors, and ostensibly any public ﬁgure may at least
attempt to engage in these steps and attract an audience in the process, with or without
formal organisational support.
As a set of coordinated activities as well as a way of relating, digital vigilantism is
characterised by seeking and making use of targets’ personal information, rendering
them visible to public scrutiny. The study of these developments can best be addressed
by considering visibility as a fundamental condition of social life, and one that is being
multilaterally renegotiated through digital media use in a range of contexts, including
policing as well as moral and civic practices.33 Alongside embodied visibility, individuals
are primarily known to the public through their online presence, coupled with public
records and other open sources. We may consider conditions of visibility being shaped
by factors including legislation, social media platform terms of use, journalistic practices
and standards, and broader cultural expectations about concepts like privacy, publicity
and reputation.
Mediated policing refers to pre-emptive potential for a campaign, but can also be
understood as a more general resting state for digital media users. This denotes an
awareness and consideration of steps taken in anticipation or in response to a perceived
oﬀence. It is expressed through digital and conventional media through which the
audience is implored to adopt a speciﬁc predisposition. This can be accomplished by
making an explicit appeal to an audience (for example, in the description of a Facebook
group, or in a televised program), or by the media actor implicitly prescribing an attitude
through their conduct, or in press coverage of events. We can further distinguish
between a reactive mode of policing, and deliberately seeking out actionable content,
for example, when the Russian group Occupy Paedophilia engages in so-called ‘safaris’.34
Such sentiment may be expressed in press releases and journalistic coverage of cam-
paigns. Likewise, social actors themselves can express their motivations and experiences
when engaging in mediated policing as individuals or on behalf of an institution.
As a key dimension of mediated policing, vigilance entails a willingness to scrutinise
social(ly mediated) life, and to act on oﬀending events if they occur. It is partly informed
by a culture of vigilantism that appeals to citizens to take matters into their own hands,
but also a mediated culture of participation that solicits more active involvement from
media users, albeit under speciﬁc circumstances.35 Vigilance can be understood as steps
and measures taken by participating members, including the audience. These are often
found in instructions on websites, or implicitly mentioned in newspaper editorials.
Vigilance may be framed as passive through listening or lurking in the case of digitally
mediated social interactions. Participants do not initially have an active presence, but are
rather positioned to catch an oﬀensive act, or recover oﬀensive content. Other forms of
activity related to mediated interfaces (‘liking’; ‘sharing’; ‘subscribing’; ‘commenting’) are
both empowering by conferring agency to the audience-as-participant, but also gen-
erate information about them that can be retained by group administrators, and plat-
form operators more exclusively. This position in turn sets up the expectation of actions
among participants later upon discovery of an oﬀence and target. We can consider
a distinction between the participation of primary media actors (witnessing events;
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trawling through a proﬁle archive), and of audiences (sharing and reacting to content).
Participation-as-vigilance serves to sustain groups in terms of membership, but also to
generate diverse forms of capital.36 More recent forms of measuring capital like the so-
called engagement economy are trialled as ways to reproduce economic and social
capital, and are expressed as strategies to capitalise on social media platforms.37 In
looking at mediated content distributed by individuals, one can work towards an
account of vigilance by considering the kind of resting state that audiences are expected
to take (how is their consumption of media content described? How is it related to
a broader societal context, including public spaces and speciﬁc national or regional
territories?). Researchers can also consider the kinds of active steps participants are
expected to take in the discovery of oﬀences, for example, by noting references to
how citizens are expected to perform when looking out for oﬀences, and whether this
performance is prescribed, proscribed or simply anticipated. Furthermore, they may
consider how the categorical aﬃliations and broader social status of those who partici-
pate are expressed in reports on such cases.
Mediated policing, as represented in personal blogs, government websites or even
reality television, requires an emphasis on speciﬁc moral concerns that warrant citizen
scrutiny and intervention. For example, the feminist blog ‘Movethefuckoverbro’
addresses the gendered use of space through its description, as well as through discus-
sions in the comments section.38 Scholars may consider whether the oﬀence is framed
as part of a broader social condition, or alternatively as an isolated incident for which the
perpetrator is solely responsible. In addition to proscriptive elements, media actors may
appeal to prescriptive characteristics that are deemed to be desirable or necessary to
preserve through participation. Recent examples are often territorial, making reference
to (the qualities of) a particular country, city or region and/or a related identity or culture
that needs to be actively defended. They may also make reference to nostalgic or
otherwise idealised social conditions that are endangered by the perceived oﬀence.
Research should consider the grounds upon which oﬀences are framed. Along with
concrete territories, we can also consider how abstract values such as tradition, equality,
progress, justice and even cleanliness are expressed in relation to denunciations.
Digital vigilantism may also reﬂect a troubled relation between citizen and state.
Practices that mobilise individuals to identify and denounce other individuals may be
expressed as an explicit criticism of the ineﬀectiveness or unwillingness of the police to
intervene in oﬀences, or even the ineligibility of the state to govern over mediated
oﬀences. In this sense, campaigns may echo early models of self-policing online where
these spaces are seen as independent of any single territory and its governance,
a sentiment that is carried into certain strains of cyber-libertarianism and is further
complicated through the apparent dissolution of any clear distinction between online
and oﬄine activity.39 It may otherwise simply be an obviation of police duties, for
example in the investigation of the Boston Marathon Bombing, or 2011 riot in
Vancouver.40 As such it is worth considering how various branches of the state are
described in relation to speciﬁc oﬀences, but also in relation to extrajudicial responses.
Researchers can consider references to a perceived need to defer to the police or courts,
and expressions in favour of ‘due process’, as well as concepts with judicial purchase
such as proportionality or privacy. Relatedly, they may consider references to a lack of
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conﬁdence in the police and courts based on a variety of grounds (lack of capabilities;
lack of interest; lack of funding; lack of technical expertise).
During the course of mediated policing, participants may come to discover oﬀensive
conduct, either by witnessing and presumably recording and uploading an embodied
oﬀence, or by proactively searching for objectionable content in a target’s online pre-
sence. They may spread this content through mobile devices onto social platforms, and
may add editorial content that serves to reproduce mediated policing. For example it may
be expressed to sustain awareness of an issue, or a general state of vigilance, but it also
may be expressed more instrumentally through an attempt to sustain the funding and
legitimacy of an organisation. If conditions allow, an event can be collectively agreed upon
as oﬀensive and actionable, and can lead to response and re-editorialising of context. Yet
this implies a certain amount of capital and privilege on the part of those advocating for
something deemed oﬀensive, including on behalf of the initiator. An oﬀence may be
received as not ‘oﬀensive’ enough to warrant a substantial response. Likewise,
a considerable counter-denunciation may emerge if the initial participant is deemed to
have breached social norms. More recent accusations of digital content being manipu-
lated (‘photoshopped’), or simply being ‘fake news’ also oﬀer opportunities to negate the
validity of oﬀensive content.
In terms of responses to an oﬀence, we may also distinguish between a ﬁrst
and second order form of moralising, where either the initial oﬀence is denounced, or
the response of the individual under scrutiny.41 To this we may consider a third order
oﬀence, in which the response of the participants in a shaming campaign (as described
below) are assessed and possibly denounced. Taken together, these may lead to
a reconsideration of conditions of visibility that render shaming and vigilance possible.
In such responses researchers may consider how visibility as a relatively evasive notion is
expressed through coverage of these ordeals. For instance, what aspects of a target or
participant’s social life are said to be rendered visible, and which individuals, devices or
organisations are framed as being responsible for this exposure?
Mediated denunciation is sustained by an initial discovery, but also by circulation
through digital media by a range of actors. Participants impose denunciatory values and
opinions upon a target, who is identiﬁed and scrutinised through their personal infor-
mation, but also through their reputation. Here scholars should be attentive to how the
social status of a target is expressed in public discourse, as well as the grounds upon
which they are being shamed (the oﬀence in question; behaviour more generally;
perceptions of their character; categorical aﬃliation). Shaming may considered as either
reintegrative or stigmatising depending on the tone through which the editorialising
against them is expressed, as well as whether there is an expressed possibility or
actualised rehabilitation and reintegration of the target.42
Likewise, participants engage in doxing to render a target visible in a multifaceted
and lasting way by gathering and publishing any available information about them and
inviting audiences to do the same, as well as to circulate any available information about
the target.43 Scholars should consider the categories of information that participants
may seek out (medical; ﬁnancial; employment; family; location; digital media history), as
well as any that may seemingly be excluded from scrutiny, especially in the case of
information that may render others visible, such as relatives or members of a shared
community. Scholars should also consider how information gathering and distribution
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practices are described in, for example, guidelines for groups on social platforms that
identify oﬀensive individuals (ex: Reddit group descriptions). Denunciation may provoke
other forms of mediated and embodied activities, including harassment and bullying,
threats, and physical violence, often overlapping with gendered persecution and racism.
As for longer-term outcomes, researchers can also consider how the reputation and
broader social standing of the target and participants are understood and expressed
both in news reports as well as accounts by participants. Here the reputation of the
target may both be compromised through denunciatory coverage, but also explicitly
reported on in references to the aftermath of the campaign.44 They may consider
references to detrimental life events for targets, for example, an inability to sustain
employment, being excommunicated from their community, in addition to physical
interventions.
Discussion
Researchers may take into account a broad range of data that renders mediated
vigilante campaigns meaningful. This includes media produced by campaigns them-
selves, commentary by individual unaﬃliated actors, as well as commentary generated
by other participants in reaction to initial posts. Likewise, journalistic coverage often
features prominently when searching cases, including platforms that straddle
a boundary between reporting the news and utilising social media to propagate
campaigns. Still other social actors may seek to comment on these cases and phenom-
ena more broadly through guides and reports. In the context of gender-based harass-
ment, online resources45 provide direction for those on the receiving end of vitriol, and
in turn shape public perception of such incidents.
Digitally mediated vigilantism constitutes a troubling set of practices that combines
the scrutiny of targeted individuals with denunciation and a range of social harms. As
such, researchers should remain attentive that even supposedly user-led activities
inform and in turn are informed by other institutions. The press have historically
engaged in citizen shaming, which begins to overlap with digital media practices as
content from these venues attract digital media users. This amounts to a kind of hybrid
media system that not only involves individual user input, but may also shape relations
between individuals, states, and organisations.46 While journalism more broadly involves
rendering people visible through (as one example) crime reporting, the concern with
digital vigilantism is the combination of a denunciatory tone with the possibility of
audiences further participating in retaliatory activities. Contemporary denunciations
amount to a proliferation of editorialising, coupled with volatile and harmful data
handling practices. The press are composed of broadsheet and tabloid newspapers
with an aﬃliated digital media presence such as The Daily Mail, but also media agencies
that have been established and operate entirely online, such as GeenStijl.nl, Breitbart and
TheRebel.ca. Other organisations may also participate in mediated shaming. These
include citizen-led initiatives, civil society organisations, as well as proﬁt-oriented
groups. Such groups may cultivate their own mediated visibility through branding
strategies on social media. They often leverage audience cynicism in order to capitalise
on the visibility and denunciation of targeted individuals.47 As well, police and other
state agencies adopt diverging strategies towards mediated shaming. In some instances
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they advocate for and enforce privacy and data protection laws as legal mechanisms
against coordinated attacks on an individual’s social standing. Campaigns may cross
legal thresholds if threats are uttered, and may warrant police intervention. Yet in
a global context states are also making use of mediated denunciations as a potential
form of ‘soft power’, for example, in response to unpaid taxes.48 It is not always clear if
citizens are self-mobilised, or operating with the implicit deputisation by the state.
Finally, digital vigilantism occurs through social media platforms such as Twitter,
Facebook, Reddit and VKontakte along with other telecommunication and digital
media services. These services provide speciﬁc aﬀordances for the above social actors
to engage in shaming as well as generate various forms of capital. And while they may
take measures to minimise harmful outcomes such as doxing and harassment, their
business models beneﬁt from viral spikes in online engagement following controversial
shaming campaigns, to the extent that they may tolerate or even cultivate such
coordinated forms of social harm.
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